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Abstract 
This study investigates an endogenous R&D timing game between duopoly firms which undertake cost-
reducing R&D investments and then play Cournot output competition. We examine equilibrium 
outcomes in private and mixed markets and find that spillovers rate critically affects contrasting results. 
We show that a simultaneous-move appears in a private duopoly only if the spillovers rate is low while 
a sequential-move appears in a mixed duopoly irrespective of spillovers. We also show that public 
leadership is the only equilibrium if the spillovers rate is intermediate and its resulting welfare is the 
highest. Finally, we show that the implementation of privatization policy transforms a public leader to 
a private competitor, but this can decrease the social welfare. 
Running Head: Endogenous R&D Timing and Privatization 
JEL Classifications: L13; L32; H21 
Keywords: private duopoly; mixed duopoly; R&D spillovers; endogenous R&D timing game. 
1. Introduction 
Previous literature of an endogenous timing game in a Cournot oligopoly has heavily used an 
observable delay game since it is formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). It is shown that in private 
duopoly profit-maximizing firms decide simultaneously when competing in quantities and sequentially 
when competing in prices. However, in a mixed duopoly where a profit-maximizing private firm 
                                                          

 Sang-Ho Lee: Department of Economics, Chonnam National University, 300 Yongbong-ro, Bukgu, Gwangju 
61186 South Korea. E-mail: sangho@chonnam.ac.kr 

 Timur Muminov: Department of Economics, Chonnam National University, 300 Yongbong-ro, Bukgu, 
Gwangju 61186 South Korea. E-mail: smtk0171@gmail.com 
competes with a welfare-maximizing public firm, the results are reversed and both firms decide 
sequentially when competing in quantities and simultaneously when competing in prices.1 
Besides understanding these conflicting results in production market competition, as innovations 
have intensified R&D competition among firms, governments have recognized the importance of R&D 
policies and emphasized the facilitation of innovation in society. 2  Recent policy concerns over 
innovation suggest the need for further examination of what allows for endogenous R&D decisions for 
the possibility of considering public policies such as regulating public institutions and organizations or 
privatization of the public firms.3 
Due to its cost-reducing features associated with the existence of R&D spillovers (knowledge 
sharing) and its implications on innovation and competition activities, the works on R&D policies are 
currently gaining importance and have become highly popular. There have been considerable researches 
devoted to investigate main determinants which lead firms to internalize R&D performances and 
spillovers. For instance, Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), Poyago-Theotoky (1995, 1999) and Baranes and 
Tropeano (2003) constructed a theoretical model of endogenous R&D spillovers. Gil Molto et al. (2011, 
2018), Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013), Lee and Tomaru (2017), Lee et al. (2017) and Haruna and Goel 
(2017, 2018) investigated the role of R&D policies in mixed oligopolies where firms compete in R&D 
investments and examined the relationship between R&D activity and public policy. 
                                                          
1
 Ono (1978), Dowrick (1986), Robson (1990) and Matsumura (1999) discussed endogenous timing in private 
markets. Since the work by Pal (1998), Bárcena-Ruiz (2007). Lu (2006), Lu and Poddar (2009) and Heywood and 
Ye (2009) extended the analysis into the mixed markets. For recent analysis, see Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2010), 
Tomaru and Kiyono (2010), Balogh and Tasnadi (2012), Amir and Feo (2014), Matsumura and Ogawa (2010, 
2014, 2017), Naya (2015), Din and Sun (2016) and Lee and Xu (2018) among others.  
2
 EU institutions have reaffirmed their commitment to R&D policies and consequently, the budgets of the research 
Framework Programs (FPs) have grown from EUR 3.3 billion in the first FP, launched in 1984, to EUR 80 billion 
of Horizon 2020. For more details, see Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002), Marinucci (2012) and Lee and Muminov 
(2017). 
3 In the last generation, there have been considerable theoretical works on R&D and policy implications for 
innovation under imperfect competition along with different structures of ownership. In the literature of mixed 
oligopolies, the works by Delbono and Denicolo (1993) and Nett (1994) have motivated the analysis of R&D 
decision. For recent studies, see Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006), Heywood and Ye (2009), Gil-Molto et al. (2011), 
Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013), Lee et al. (2017) and Lee and Tomaru (2017) among others.  
Previous analyses have heavily investigated the fixed timing of firms’ decision on R&D where 
mostly simultaneous-move game in R&D investment is exogenously given. However, firms may choose 
their R&D level sequentially (not only what action to take, but when to take them) given conditions for 
knowledge sharing in a certain market-place. We incorporate this important aspect into the model with 
an endogenous timing game and analyze the strategic movement of R&D investment. 
This paper is the first to investigate an endogenous timing game on strategic timing choice of 
cost-reducing R&D investment with R&D spillovers in private and mixed duopolies. We extend an 
observable delay game into the two-period duopoly game that firms first determine their cost reducing 
R&D investments either simultaneously or sequentially given the rate of spillovers, and then play 
Cournot output competition. That is, we consider a Cournot duopoly in output competition but allow for 
an endogenous timing in R&D investments. This structural enhancement of the model allows us to 
anticipate when the firms are likely to play either a leader or a follower in making their R&D investments 
decision.  
We highlight that the rate of spillovers is crucial in determining equilibrium of endogenous R&D 
choices in both private and mixed markets. We also indicate that welfare consequences are contrast 
between the two markets, depending on the timing of R&D choices. Therefore, in the process of 
privatization policy, not only the rate of spillovers but also the endogenous leadership position in R&D 
timing are important factors in determining welfare consequences.  
Our main findings are as follows: First, a leader’s R&D and output are higher than those of a 
follower for any rate of spillover under the sequential-move game in a private market while public firm’s 
R&D and output are higher than those of the private firm for any market structure in a mixed duopoly. 
Hence, the presence of public firm enhances not only total R&D expenditures but also total market 
outputs. 
Second, in a private duopoly, a simultaneous-move is equilibrium if the spillovers rate is low while 
a sequential-move is otherwise. This implies that the simultaneous-move game in R&D decisions is 
plausible in the case of no spillovers, but if there exist R&D spillovers, it might be problematic. We also 
show that a sequential-move in R&D choices yields a higher total R&D investments and total market 
outputs. Thus, a higher rate of spillovers can work for changing the equilibrium of an endogenous R&D 
timing game to a sequential-move game and enhance the welfare. This result complements previous 
findings in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) who showed that the equilibrium of an endogenous timing 
game is that both firms choose outputs (under the same R&D investments in the absence of spillovers) 
simultaneously. However, when the spillovers rate is high, both firms prefer a sequential-move in R&D 
choices even though they prefer a simultaneous-move in output choices. 
Third, in a mixed duopoly, a simultaneous-move game cannot be equilibrium. Thus, in the 
existence of public firm, the sequential game in R&D decisions is more plausible irrespective of the rate 
of spillovers. Further, public leadership is the only equilibrium if the spillovers rate is intermediate and 
its welfare is always higher than that under the other two cases. This result is in contrast to the previous 
studies in Pal (1998), Tomaru and Kiyono (2010) and Matsumura and Ogawa (2010, 2017) who showed 
that private leadership is more robust in a mixed market with quantity competition. Our findings 
highlight the key role of R&D spillovers which can change the equilibrium outcome between private 
and public leadership of the endogenous R&D timing game in a mixed market. 
Finally, we demonstrate that implementation of privatization policy by government may transform 
public leader to a private leader which in turn decrease the social welfare for any rate of spillovers. This 
is because privatization policy decrease total industry R&D investments and outputs for any rate of 
spillovers. Our analysis reveals that the rate of spillovers does not affect welfare consequences under 
privatization policy. This is consistent with the result of Gil-Moltó et al. (2011), who showed that 
privatization is not desirable, regardless of whether the government provides R&D subsidies to private 
and public ﬁrms. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a basic duopoly 
model of R&D investment with spillovers. In section 3 and 4, we analyze an endogenous R&D timing 
game in private and mixed duopolies, respectively. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes and 
examine the welfare effect of privatization policy in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The Model 
We consider a duopoly with homogeneous goods in an R&D and then quantity-setting game. Let the 
inverse demand function be 𝑃(𝑄) = 𝑎 − 𝑄, where 𝑃(Q) is market price, 𝑄 = 𝑞0 + 𝑞1 is market output, 
and 𝑞𝑖 is output of firm i = 0,1, respectively. The consumer surplus is calculated as 𝐶𝑆 = 𝑄2/2. 
We assume a (convex) production cost function of the firm where each firm has an increasing cost 
function in production and R&D investment. In specific, we assume the following cost function, which 
is used in the literature of the cost-reducing innovation4: 
𝐶(𝑞𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) = (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽𝑥𝑗)𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖2   and   𝛤(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖2,     𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.                          (1) 
where 𝑎 > 𝑐 > 0 and 𝑥𝑖 denotes the amount of R&D investment for firm i, which exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale, i.e., the firm has to spend 𝑥𝑖2 to implement cost-reducing R&D, 𝑥𝑖. Note that the initial 
cost 𝑐 is reduced not only by each firm’s R&D investment, 𝑥𝑖, but by the rival’s R&D investment, 𝛽𝑥𝑗, 
where 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] denotes the R&D spillovers rate. Thus, R&D investment can reduce a firm’s own cost 
by 𝑥𝑖 and the rival firm’s cost by 𝛽𝑥𝑖 per unit of output, depending on the spillovers rate.  
The profit function of the firm is as follows: 
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑎 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞𝑗)𝑞𝑖 − (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽𝑥𝑗)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖2 − 𝑥𝑖2,     𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.                            (2) 
We define social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and both firms’ profits: 
𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜋0 + 𝜋1.                                                                                                                                           (3) 
                                                          
4 The model with linear demand and quadratic cost functions is a standard formulation and popularly used in the 
literature since D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). In the literature of mixed oligopolies, see Gil Molto et al. 
(2011, 2018), Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013), Lee et al. (2017) and Leal et al. (2018, 2019). It can rule out an 
uninteresting corner solution case of a public monopoly. Matsumura and Okamura (2015) and Kim et al. (2019) 
also provided the economic rationale behind this formulation. The production cost shows that a firm’s R&D 
investment shifts its marginal cost function downwards, 𝜕𝐶/𝜕𝑞𝑖 = 𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖−𝛽𝑥𝑗 + 2𝑞𝑖, but does not alter its slope. 
In the followings, we examine two models of private and mixed duopolies in which one of two firms 
(say firm 0) is either a private firm or a public firm while the other firm (say firm 1) is a private firm in 
both cases. We assume that private firm maximizes its profit in (2) while the public firm is fully owned 
by a benevolent government which maximizes the social welfare in (3).  
The setting is a multi-stage game with an observable delay period formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky 
(199). In the first stage, each firm simultaneously chooses whether to move early or late in determining 
its R&D investment. The following game played in the second stage is either a simultaneous R&D if 
both firms choose the same period or a sequential R&D otherwise. In the last stage, both firms compete 
with outputs simultaneously. We solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of these games by 
backward induction. 
3. Private duopoly 
In this section, we first consider a fixed-timing game in R&D decisions in a private duopoly, and then 
examine the first-stage in an endogenous timing game. 
3.1. Output decisions 
In the last stage of output choice, the first-order conditions of private firms are as follows:5 𝜕𝜋𝑖𝜕𝑞𝑖 = 𝑎 − 𝑞𝑗 − 4𝑞𝑖 − (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽𝑥𝑗) = 0,     𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.                                                       (4) 
Equation (4) yields the following response functions of each firm: 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝑎 − 𝑞𝑗 − (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽𝑥𝑗)4 ,     𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.                                                                              (5) 
As usual, outputs are strategic substitutes for both firms. Solving these reaction functions provide the 
following equilibrium output levels of each firm in the last stage: 
                                                          
5 Note that all the second-order conditions of the equilibrium outcomes in this study are satisfied. 
𝑞𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) = 3(𝑎 − 𝑐) + (4 − 𝛽)𝑥𝑖 − (1 − 4𝛽)𝑥𝑗15 ,     𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.                                           (6) 
The relationship between outputs and R&D choices are as follows: 
𝜕𝑞𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑥𝑗)𝜕𝑥𝑖 = 4−𝛽15 > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜕𝑞𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑥𝑗)𝜕𝑥𝑗 = − 1−4𝛽15 >< 0 if 𝛽 >< 1/4,     𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
It shows that an increase in R&D by the firm increases its output, but increases (decreases) its rival’s 
output if the spillovers rate is high (low).  
3.2 R&D decisions  
In the second stage, each firm chooses R&D investment to maximize its profits, depending on the timing 
of movement chosen in the first stage. We analyze two scenarios: simultaneous and sequential choices 
of R&D investment. 
3.2.1. Simultaneous R&D 
Putting (6) into the profit function in (2) and taking the first-order conditions provide the following 
response functions of each firm: 
𝑥𝑖(𝑥𝑗) = 2(4 − 𝛽)(3(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 − 4𝛽)𝑥𝑗)193 + 2(8 − 𝛽)𝛽 ,     𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.                                                   (7) 
Note that R&D decisions are strategic substitutes when the rate of spillovers is low but become strategic 
complements as the rate of spillovers increases. That is, 𝑥𝑖(𝑥𝑗)𝜕𝑥𝑗 >< 0  if 𝛽 >< 1/4 . Solving the reaction 
functions provides the equilibrium R&D investments: 
𝑥𝑖𝐶𝑃 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(4 − 𝛽)67 − 2(3 − 𝛽)𝛽 .                                                                                                                                  (8) 
where the superscript CP denotes the equilibrium under the simultaneous-move Cournot game in a 
Private market. It shows that firm’s R&D investment is positive and decreasing in the rate of spillovers, 
that is, 𝜕𝑥𝑖𝐶𝑃𝜕𝛽 < 0. 
Then, putting (8) into (6), we have the equilibrium outputs of the last stage: 
𝑞𝑖𝐶𝑃 = 15(𝑎 − 𝑐)67 − 2(3 − 𝛽)𝛽 .                                                                                                                                   (9) 
Note that both firms increase their outputs as the rate of spillovers increases, that is, 𝜕𝑞𝑖𝐶𝑃𝜕𝛽 > 0.  
The resulting profit of the private firm and social welfare are as follows, respectively: 
 𝜋𝑖𝐶𝑃 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(193 + 2(8 − 𝛽)𝛽)(67 − 2(3 − 𝛽)𝛽)2 , 
𝑊𝐶𝑃 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(611 + 4(8 − 𝛽)𝛽)(67 − 2(3 − 𝛽)𝛽)2 .                                                                                                      (10) 
Then, firm’s profits and social welfare increase as the spillovers rate increases. 
3.2.2. Sequential R&D leadership 
In this case, we further assume that firm 0 plays a leading position in a private market. Using backward 
induction, a follower firm 1 chooses its R&D investment after observing the R&D investment by the 
firm 0. The first-order condition of the firm 1 provides the response function in (7). Inserting 𝑥1(𝑥0) 
into the profit function of firm 0 and using the first-order condition, we get the followings: 
 𝑥0𝐿𝑃 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(4 − 𝛽)(13 + 2𝛽2)(37 + 10𝛽 − 2𝛽2)31841 + 8880𝛽 − 2518𝛽2 + 768𝛽3 − 228𝛽4 + 64𝛽5 − 8𝛽6, 
𝑥1𝐿𝑃 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(4 − 𝛽)(475 + 178𝛽 − 48𝛽2 + 20𝛽3 − 4𝛽4)31841 + 8880𝛽 − 2518𝛽2 + 768𝛽3 − 228𝛽4 + 64𝛽5 − 8𝛽6 .                                            (11) 
where the superscript LP denotes the equilibrium under the sequential-move game with firm’s 
Leadership in a Private market. Note that a leading firm always undertakes larger investment than that 
of a following firm, i.e., 𝑥0𝐿𝑃 ≥ 𝑥1𝐿𝑃. However, as the spillovers rate increases, both firms decrease their 
R&D investments, i.e., 𝜕𝑥𝑖𝐿𝑃𝜕𝛽 < 0, 
Then, putting (11) into (6), we have the equilibrium outputs of the last stage: 
 𝑞0𝐿𝑃 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(193 + 2(8 − 𝛽)𝛽)(37 + 2(5 − 𝛽)𝛽)31841 + 8880𝛽 − 2518𝛽2 + 768𝛽3 − 228𝛽4 + 64𝛽5 − 8𝛽6, 
𝑞1𝐿𝑃 = 15(𝑎 − 𝑐)(475 + 178𝛽 − 48𝛽2 + 20𝛽3 − 4𝛽4)31841 + 8880𝛽 − 2518𝛽2 + 768𝛽3 − 228𝛽4 + 64𝛽5 − 8𝛽6 .                                            (12) 
Note that a leader always produces larger output than that of a follower, i.e., 𝑞0𝐿𝑃 ≥ 𝑞1𝐿𝑃. Thus, private 
leader is more aggressive in both R&D investment and output production for any rate of spillovers under 
the sequential-move R&D in a private market. Note also that as the spillovers rate increases, both firms 
increase their outputs, i.e., 𝜕𝑞𝑖𝐿𝑃𝜕𝛽 > 0. 
The resulting profits of private firms and social welfare are as follows, respectively: 
 𝜋0𝐿𝑃 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(37 + 10𝛽 − 2𝛽2)231841 + 8880𝛽 − 2518𝛽2 + 768𝛽3 − 228𝛽4 + 64𝛽5 − 8𝛽6, 
𝜋1𝐿𝑃 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(193 + 16𝛽 − 2𝛽2)(475 + 178𝛽 − 48𝛽2 + 20𝛽3 − 4𝛽4)2(31841 + 8880𝛽 − 2518𝛽2 + 768𝛽3 − 228𝛽4 + 64𝛽5 − 8𝛽6)2 .                              (13) 
𝑊𝐿𝑃 =
2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(138015643 + 108999896𝛽 + 627808𝛽2 −3582584𝛽3 + 1797532𝛽4 − 812816𝛽5 +137056𝛽6 − 15392𝛽7 − 3344𝛽8 + 1152𝛽9 − 64𝛽10)(31841 + 8880𝛽 − 2518𝛽2 + 768𝛽3 − 228𝛽4 + 64𝛽5 − 8𝛽6)2 .                                    (14) 
Then, profits of both private firms and social welfare increase as the spillovers rate increases.  
3.3 Endogenous R&D timing 
We examine the modified format of the observable delay game in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) where 
both private firms choose its timing to move between “early” (𝑡𝑖 =1) and “late” (𝑡𝑖=2) in determining 
their R&D choices. If both firms choose the same period, it yields the equilibrium of a simultaneous-
move game. Otherwise, the equilibrium under a sequential-move game with leadership emerges. 
Table 1 provides the payoff matrix of the observable delay game in a private market.6 
Table 1: Payoff Matrix in a Private Market 
                                       Firm 1 
Firm 0 𝑡1 = 1 𝑡1 = 2 𝑡0 = 1 𝜋0𝐶𝑃, 𝜋1𝐶𝑃 𝜋0𝐿𝑃, 𝜋1𝐿𝑃 𝑡0 = 2 𝜋1𝐿𝑃, 𝜋0𝐿𝑃 𝜋0𝐶𝑃 , 𝜋1𝐶𝑃  
Lemma 1. 𝜋1𝐿𝑃 < 𝜋𝑖𝐶𝑃 < 𝜋0𝐿𝑃 if 𝛽 < 0.25 while 𝜋𝑖𝐶𝑃 < 𝜋0𝐿𝑃 < 𝜋1𝐿𝑃 if  𝛽 > 0.25.  
It states that a leader’s profit is higher (lower) than that of follower when the spillovers rate is low (high), 
i.e., 𝜋0𝐿𝑃 >< 𝜋1𝐿𝑃 if 𝛽 <> 0.25. This is because private leader is more aggressive in both R&D investment 
and output production under the sequential-move game, which might cause lower profit to the leader 
(but higher than that under simultaneous-move game) when the spillovers rate is high and thus free-
riding effect is strong. Using this lemma, we have the following result: 
Proposition 1. The equilibrium of endogenous R&D timing game in a private market is as follows: 
(i) If β[0, 0.25], then a simultaneous-move is the only equilibrium; (t0, t1) = (1,1); 
(ii) If 𝛽(0.25, 1], a sequential-move is an equilibrium; (𝑡0, 𝑡1) = (1,2) or (𝑡0, 𝑡1) = (2,1). 
Proposition 1 states that the rate of spillovers is crucial in determining the equilibrium of an endogenous 
R&D timing game in a private market. In special, the only equilibrium is a simultaneous-move game if 
spillovers rate is low while one of sequential-move games appear otherwise. Thus, simultaneous-move 
game cannot be an equilibrium for a higher rate of spillovers. It implies that the sequential game in R&D 
                                                          
6 The proofs of lemmas and propositions are provided in Appendix. 
decisions is more plausible in a private market for higher rate of spillovers. This result complements the 
findings in the quantity setting game that in the absence of spillovers, private firms decide the timing of 
movement simultaneously (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990). However, when the spillovers rate is high, 
both firms prefer a sequential-move in R&D choices even though they prefer a simultaneous-move in 
output choices.  
Finally, we can show that social welfare under the sequential-move in R&D is always higher than 
that under the simultaneous-move game in a private market for any rate of spillovers, i.e., 𝑊𝐶𝑃≤ 𝑊𝐿𝑃 
where the equality satisfies if  𝛽 = 0.250.  Thus, we have the following result. 
Proposition 2. When the spillovers rate is not so low, the equilibrium with a sequential-move R&D 
leadership in a private market is always socially beneficial. 
4. Mixed duopoly 
In this section, we assume that firm 0 is a fully nationalized public firm that maximizes the welfare in 
(3). We first consider a fixed-timing game in R&D decisions in a mixed duopoly, and then examine the 
first-stage in an endogenous timing game. 
4.1. Output decisions 
In the last stage of output choice, the first-order conditions of the public and private firms are as follows, 
respectively: 
 𝜕𝑊𝜕𝑞0 = 𝑎 − 3𝑞0 − 𝑞1 − (𝑐 − 𝑥0 − 𝛽𝑥1) = 0, 𝜕𝜋1𝜕𝑞1 = 𝑎 − 𝑞0 − 4𝑞1 − (𝑐 − 𝑥1 − 𝛽𝑥0) = 0.                                                                                            (15) 
Rearranging these two equations yields the following response functions of firms: 
 𝑞0 = 𝑎 − 𝑞1 − (𝑐 − 𝑥0 − 𝛽𝑥1)3 , 𝑞1 = 𝑎 − 𝑞0 − (𝑐 − 𝑥1 − 𝛽𝑥0)4 .                                                                                                                   (16) 
Again, outputs are strategic substitutes for both firms. Solving these reaction functions provide the 
following equilibrium output levels of both firms in the last stage, respectively: 
 𝑞0(𝑥0, 𝑥1) = 3(𝑎 − 𝑐) + (4 − 𝛽)𝑥0 − (1 − 4𝛽)𝑥111 ,  𝑞1(𝑥0, 𝑥1) = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 − 3𝛽)𝑥0 + (3 − 𝛽)𝑥111 , 
𝑄(𝑥0, 𝑥1) = 5(𝑎 − 𝑐) + (3 + 2𝛽)𝑥0 + (2 + 3𝛽)𝑥111 .                                                                              (17) 
The relationship between outputs and R&D are as follows: 
𝜕𝑞0( 𝑥0,𝑥1)𝜕𝑥0 = 4−𝛽11 > 0,       𝜕𝑞0( 𝑥0,𝑥1)𝜕𝑥1 = − 1−4𝛽11 >< 0 if 𝛽 >< 1/4  and   
𝜕𝑞1( 𝑥0,𝑥1)𝜕𝑥1 = 3−𝛽11 > 0,       𝜕𝑞1( 𝑥0,𝑥1)𝜕𝑥0 = − 1−3𝛽11 >< 0 if 𝛽 >< 1/3 
It shows that an increase in R&D by the firm increases the outputs of the firms, but that of the public 
firm is higher than that of the private firm, that is, 𝜕𝑞0( 𝑥0,𝑥1)𝜕𝑥0 >  𝜕𝑞1( 𝑥0,𝑥1)𝜕𝑥1 > 0. It also shows that firm’s 
R&D increases (decreases) the output of the rival firm if the rate of spillovers is relatively high (low).  
4.2 R&D decisions  
In the second stage, both firms choose R&D investments to maximize their objective functions, 
respectively, depending on the timing of movement chosen in the first stage. We analyze three scenarios: 
one simultaneous and two sequential choices with public firm leadership and private firm leadership, 
respectively, in R&D investment. 
4.2.1. Simultaneous R&D 
Putting (7) into the objective function of each firm in (2) for a private firm and (3) for a public firm and 
taking the first-order conditions provide the following response functions of each firm: 
𝑥0(𝑥1) = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(31 + 28𝛽) − (14 − 𝛽(87 − 14𝛽))𝑥1197 + 14𝛽(2 − 3𝛽) .                                                                    (18) 𝑥1(𝑥0) = 2(3 − 𝛽)(2(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (1 − 3𝛽)𝑥0)103 + 2(6 − 𝛽)𝛽 .                                                                                         (19) 
It shows that R&D decisions are strategic substitutes when the rate of spillovers is relatively low but 
become strategic complements as the rate increases. That is, 𝑥0(𝑥1)𝜕𝑥1 >< 0 if 𝛽 >< 0.165 and 𝑥1(𝑥0)𝜕𝑥0 >< 0 if 𝛽 >< 0.333. Note also that if the spillovers rate is intermediate, 0.165 < 𝛽 < 0.333, the public firm’s 
R&D increases as the private firm’s R&D increases, i.e., strategic complements for a public firm, while 
the private firm’s R&D decreases as the public firm’s R&D increases, i.e., strategic substitutes for a 
private firm. Solving the reaction functions provides the equilibrium R&D investments: 
 𝑥0𝐶𝑀 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(25 + 2(18 − 𝛽)𝛽)167 + 2(25 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)𝛽 , 
𝑥1𝐶𝑀 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(9 − 𝛽2)167 + 2(25 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)𝛽 .                                                                                                            (20) 
where the superscript CM denotes the equilibrium under the simultaneous-move Cournot game in a 
Mixed market. Note that the public firm always undertakes larger investment than that of a private firm, 
i.e., 𝑥0𝐶𝑀 > 𝑥1𝐶𝑀. As the spillovers rate increases, the public firm’s R&D increases, i.e., 𝜕𝑥0𝐶𝑀𝜕𝛽 > 0, while 
that of the private firm depends on the rate, i.e., 𝜕𝑥1𝐶𝑀𝜕𝛽 >< 0 if 𝛽 >< 0.879. However, the total R&D increases 
as spillovers rate increase, i.e., 𝜕(𝑥0𝐶𝑀+𝑥1𝐶𝑀)𝜕𝛽 > 0.  
Then, putting (20) into (17), we have the equilibrium outputs of the last stage: 
 𝑞0𝐶𝑀 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(53 + 𝛽(31 − 18𝛽))167 + 2(25 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)𝛽 , 
𝑞1𝐶𝑀 = 11(𝑎 − 𝑐)(3 + 𝛽)167 + 2(25 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)𝛽 .                                                                                                            (21) 
Note that 𝑞0𝐶𝑀 > 𝑞1𝐶𝑀. It states that the public firm’s R&D and output are higher than those of the private 
firm for any rate of spillovers. Thus, the public firm is more aggressive in both R&D investment and 
output production under simultaneous-move game in a mixed market. Note also that both firms’ outputs 
increase as the spillovers rate increases, i.e., 𝜕𝑞𝑖𝐶𝑀𝜕𝛽 > 0.  
The resulting profit of the private firm and social welfare are as follows, respectively: 
 𝜋1𝐶𝑀 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(3 + 𝛽)2(103 + 2(6 − 𝛽)𝛽)(167 + 2(25 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)𝛽)2 , 
𝑊𝐶𝑀 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)2(7736 + 𝛽(6550 − 𝛽(2495 + 2𝛽(864 − 239𝛽))))(167 + 2(25 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)𝛽)2 .                                            (22) 
Then, firm’s profits and social welfare increase as the spillovers rate increases. 
4.2.2. Sequential R&D with public leadership 
We further address a Stackelberg leadership situation, in which the public firm plays a leading position 
and the private firm acts as a follower in R&D choices. Using backward induction, the private firm 
chooses its R&D investment after observing the R&D investment by the public firm. The first-order 
condition of the private follower provides the response function in (18). Inserting 𝑥1(𝑥0) into the 
welfare function and using the first-order condition for the public firm’s R&D, we get the followings: 
 𝑥0𝐿𝑀 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(2551 + 3890𝛽 + 764𝛽2 − 122𝛽3 − 84𝛽4 + 12𝛽5)17189 + 7440𝛽 − 5922𝛽2 − 236𝛽3 − 4𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 − 12𝛽6, 𝑥1𝐿𝑀 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(927 + 126𝛽 − 205𝛽2 + 92𝛽3 − 42𝛽4 + 6𝛽5)17189 + 7440𝛽 − 5922𝛽2 − 236𝛽3 − 4𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 − 12𝛽6 .                                             (23) 
where the superscript LM denotes the equilibrium under the sequential-move public Leadership in a 
Mixed market. Note that a public leader always undertakes larger investment than that of a private 
follower, i.e., 𝑥0𝐿𝑀 > 𝑥1𝐿𝑀 . As the spillovers rate increases, the public leader’s R&D increases, i.e., 𝜕𝑥0𝐿𝑀𝜕𝛽 > 0  while that of private follower depends on the spillovers rate, i.e., 𝜕𝑥1𝐿𝑀𝜕𝛽 >< 0 if 𝛽 >< 0.759 . 
However, the total R&D increases as the spillovers rate increase, i.e., 𝜕(𝑥0𝐿𝑀+𝑥1𝐿𝑀)𝜕𝛽 > 0.  
Then, putting (23) into (17), we have the equilibrium outputs of the last stage: 
 𝑞0𝐿𝑀 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(5447 + 3863𝛽 − 1562𝛽2 − 344𝛽3 + 54𝛽4)17189 + 7440𝛽 − 5922𝛽2 − 236𝛽3 − 4𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 − 12𝛽6, 𝑞1𝐿𝑀 = 11(𝑎 − 𝑐)(309 + 145𝛽 − 20𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 − 6𝛽4)17189 + 7440𝛽 − 5922𝛽2 − 236𝛽3 − 4𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 − 12𝛽6 .                                             (24) 
Note that 𝑞0𝐿𝑀 > 𝑞1𝐿𝑀 and 𝜕𝑞𝑖𝐿𝑀𝜕𝛽 > 0. It states that the public leader’s output is higher than that of the 
private follower. It also implies that the public leader is more aggressive in both R&D investment and 
output production for any spillover rate under the sequential-move with public leadership in a mixed 
market. 
The resulting profit of the private firm and social welfare are as follows, respectively: 
 𝜋1𝐿𝑀 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(103 + 12𝛽 − 2𝛽2)(309 + 145𝛽 − 20𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 − 6𝛽4)2(17189 + 7440𝛽 − 5922𝛽2 − 236𝛽3 − 4𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 − 12𝛽6)2 , 
𝑊𝐿𝑀 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)2(4768 + 3246𝛽 − 835𝛽2 − 192𝛽3 + 24𝛽4)17189 + 7440𝛽 − 5922𝛽2 − 236𝛽3 − 4𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 − 12𝛽6 .                                           (25) 
Then, firm’s profits and social welfare increase as the spillovers rate increases. 
4.2.3. Sequential R&D with private leadership 
We finally address the reversed Stackelberg leadership situation, in which the private firm plays a 
leading position while the public firm acts as a follower in a mixed market. Using backward induction, 
the public firm chooses its R&D investment after observing the R&D investment by the private firm. 
The first-order condition of the public follower provides the response function in (18). Inserting 𝑥0(𝑥1) 
into the profit function and using the first-order condition for the private firm’s R&D, we get the 
followings: 
 𝑥0𝐹𝑀 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(4897 + 2𝛽(4039 − 𝛽(622 + 467𝛽)))32759 + 2𝛽(7936 − 𝛽(9576 + 𝛽(692 − 761𝛽))), 𝑥1𝐹𝑀 = 242(𝑎 − 𝑐)(3 + 𝛽)(5 − (2 − 𝛽)𝛽)32759 + 2𝛽(7936 − 𝛽(9576 + 𝛽(692 − 761𝛽))).                                                               (26) 
where the superscript FM denotes the equilibrium under the sequential-move private leadership (public 
Followership) in a Mixed market. Note that a private leader always undertakes smaller investment than 
that of a public follower, i.e., 𝑥0𝐹𝑀 > 𝑥1𝐹𝑀. As the spillovers rate increases, the public follower’s R&D 
increases, i.e., 𝜕𝑥0𝐹𝑀𝜕𝛽 > 0 while that of the private leader depends on the spillovers rate, i.e., 𝜕𝑥1𝐹𝑀𝜕𝛽 >< 0 if >< 0.391. However, the total R&D increases as the spillovers rate increase, i.e., 𝜕(𝑥0𝐹𝑀+𝑥1𝐹𝑀)𝜕𝛽 > 0.  
Then, putting (27) into (17), we have the equilibrium outputs of the last stage: 
 𝑞0𝐹𝑀 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(10385 + 𝛽(8163 − 2𝛽(3260 + 𝛽(269 − 294𝛽))))32759 + 2𝛽(7936 − 𝛽(9576 + 𝛽(692 − 761𝛽))) , 𝑞1𝐹𝑀 = 11(𝑎 − 𝑐)(3 + 𝛽)(197 + 14𝛽(2 − 3𝛽))32759 + 2𝛽(7936 − 𝛽(9576 + 𝛽(692 − 761𝛽))).                                                               (27) 
Note that 𝑞0𝐹𝑀 > 𝑞1𝐹𝑀  and 𝜕𝑞0𝐹𝑀𝜕𝛽 > 0  but 𝜕𝑞1𝐹𝑀𝜕𝛽 >< 0 if 𝛽 >< 0.011.  However, the total R&D and output 
increase as the spillovers rate increase, i.e., 𝜕(𝑞0𝐹𝑀+𝑞1𝐹𝑀)𝜕𝛽 > 0. It states that the public follower’s output is 
higher than that of the private leader. Thus, the public leader is more aggressive in both R&D investment 
and output production for any spillover rate under the sequential-move with private leadership in a 
mixed market. 
The resulting profit of the private firm and social welfare are as follows, respectively: 
 𝜋1𝐹𝑀 = 242(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(3 + 𝛽)232759 + 2𝛽(7936 − 𝛽(9576 + 𝛽(692 − 761𝛽))), 
𝑊𝐹𝑀 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)2 {
297785216 + 𝛽(362599906 − 𝛽(197568983 +2𝛽(108875022 − 𝛽(41846137 + 2𝛽(7595446 − 𝛽(2962433 + 882𝛽(346 − 147𝛽))))))) }(32759 + 2𝛽(7936 − 𝛽(9576 + 𝛽(692 − 761𝛽))))2                                      (28) 
Then, firm’s profits and social welfare increase as the spillovers rate increases. 
4.3 Endogenous timing game 
We examine an endogenous timing game in R&D choices in a mixed duopoly. If both firms choose the 
same period, it yields the equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game. Otherwise, the equilibrium under 
a sequential-move game with either public leadership or private leadership emerges. 
Table 2 provides the payoff matrix of the observable delay game in a mixed market. 
Table 2: Payoff Matrix in a Mixed Market 
                                    Firm 1 
Firm 0 𝑡1 = 1 𝑡1 = 2 𝑡0 = 1 𝑊𝐶𝑀, 𝜋1𝐶𝑀 𝑊𝐿𝑀 , 𝜋1𝐿𝑀 𝑡0 = 2  𝑊𝐹𝑀 , 𝜋1𝐹𝑀 𝑊𝐶𝑀, 𝜋1𝐶𝑀,  
Lemma 2. 𝜋1𝐶𝑀 ≤ 𝜋1𝐹𝑀 ≤ 𝜋1𝐿𝑀 where the equality satisfies only if 𝛽 = 0.333. 
It states that irrespective of the spillovers rate the private firm’s profit under its leadership is not higher 
than that under public leadership, but it is higher than that under the simultaneous-move game. This is 
because the public leader is the most aggressive in both R&D investment and output production, which 
increases production inefficiency of the public firm and causes the highest profits to the private follower. 
Lemma 3. 
(i) 𝑊𝐶𝑀 < 𝑊𝐿𝑀 < 𝑊𝐹𝑀 if 0 < 𝛽 < 0.163 
(ii) 𝑊𝐶𝑀 < 𝑊𝐹𝑀 < 𝑊𝐿𝑀 if 0.163 <  𝛽 < 0.165 
(iii) 𝑊𝐹𝑀 < 𝑊𝐶𝑀 < 𝑊𝐿𝑀 if 0.165 <  𝛽 < 0.333 
(iv) 𝑊𝐶𝑀 < 𝑊𝐿𝑀 < 𝑊𝐹𝑀 if 0.333 < 𝛽 < 1 
It shows that the spillovers rate is crucial in welfare rankings. The welfare under public leadership in 
R&D choices is always higher than that under the simultaneous-move game but is higher than that 
under the private leadership only when the spillovers rate is intermediate, i.e., 𝑊𝐹𝑀 < 𝑊𝐿𝑀 if  0.163 <  𝛽 < 0.333. Using this lemma, we have the following result: 
Proposition 3. The equilibrium of endogenous R&D timing game in a mixed market is as follows: 
(i) If β[0, 0.165) then either the public leadership or private leadership is an equilibrium; (t0, t1) =(1,2) or (t0, t1) = (2,1). 
(ii) If β(0.165, 0.333), then the public leadership is the only equilibrium; (t0, t1) = (1,2);  
(iii) If β(0.333, 1] , then either the public leadership or private leadership is an equilibrium; (t0, t1) = (1,2) or (t0, t1) = (2,1). 
Proposition 3 also states that the rate of spillovers is crucial in determining the equilibrium of 
endogenous R&D timing game in a mixed market. First, the simultaneous-move game cannot be an 
equilibrium, but either public or private leadership game in R&D choices will be an equilibrium. This 
result is in contrast to the results in a private market where simultaneous-move game emerges for a 
lower rate of spillovers. It also implies that the sequential game in R&D decisions is more plausible in 
a mixed market irrespective of the rate of spillovers. This finding is also in a sharp contrast to Pal (1998), 
Tomaru and Kiyono (2010) and Matsumura and Ogawa (2010, 2017) who showed that private 
leadership is more robust in a mixed market with quantity competition. Our findings highlight the key 
role of R&D factors which can change the equilibrium outcome between private and public leadership 
of the endogenous timing in a mixed market.  
Finally, we can show that the public leadership is the only equilibrium if the spillovers rate is 
intermediate, i.e., β(0.165, 0.333) and the welfare under the public leadership is always higher than 
that under the other two cases. Then, we have the following result. 
Proposition 4. When the spillovers rate is intermediate, the equilibrium with a public leadership in R&D 
choices in a mixed market is always socially beneficial.  
5. Welfare effect of privatization policy 
In this section, we examine the welfare effect of privatization policy when the government implements 
privatization, which in return affects the firms’ endogenous choice of R&D investments. 
Lemma 4. WCM > WCP and min{WFM, WLM} > WLP ≥ WCP. 
Using this lemma and comparing the equilibrium in the endogenous R&D timing game in private and mixed 
duopolies, we obtain the following results: 
Proposition 5 Privatization policy in an endogenous R&D timing game always lowers social welfare.  
Proof: Comparing the welfare in Lemma 3 and 4, we obtain the following results: (i) 𝑊𝐶𝑃 < 𝑊𝐿𝑀 <𝑊𝐹𝑀 if 0 < 𝛽 < 0.163 (ii) 𝑊𝐶𝑃 < 𝑊𝐹𝑀 < 𝑊𝐿𝑀 if 0.163 <  𝛽 < 0.25 (iii) 𝑊𝐿𝑃 < 𝑊𝐿𝑀 if 0.25 < 𝛽 < 0.333 (iv) 𝑊𝐿𝑃 < 𝑊𝐿𝑀 < 𝑊𝐹𝑀 if 0.333 < 𝛽 < 1. 
This proposition resembles the results of Fjell and Heywood (2004) and Heywood and Ye (2009) who 
considered a mixed oligopoly with quantity competition and examined the welfare effect of privatization. 
They showed that privatization results in a public leader becoming a private leader and reduces welfare. 
Lee and Xu (2018) also examined an endogenous timing with externalities and demonstrated that 
privatization will always lower social welfare. Our findings confirm that privatization in an endogenous 
R&D timing game will always lower social welfare irrespective of the spillovers rate. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This study examined an endogenous R&D timing game in private and mixed duopolies with R&D 
spillovers. We showed that the rate of spillovers is crucial in determining the equilibrium of endogenous 
R&D choices in both private and mixed markets. We also showed that its welfare consequences are 
contrast between the two markets, which is affected by the government’s privatization policy.  
In a private duopoly, we showed that a simultaneous-move is an equilibrium if the spillovers rate 
is low while a sequential-move is otherwise. We also show that a sequential-move in R&D choices 
yields a higher welfare to the society. Thus, a higher rate of spillovers can work for changing the 
equilibrium of an endogenous R&D timing game and enhance the welfare.  
In a mixed duopoly, we showed that a simultaneous-move game cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, 
in the existence of public firm, the sequential game in R&D decisions is more plausible irrespective of 
the rate of spillovers. We also showed that the public leadership is the only equilibrium if the spillovers 
rate is intermediate and its welfare is always higher than that under the other two cases. Our findings 
highlight the key role of R&D spillovers which can change the equilibrium outcome between private 
and public leadership of the endogenous R&D timing in a mixed market.  
Finally, we showed that the implementation of privatization policy transforms a public leader to a 
private competitor, but this can decrease the social welfare. Therefore, in the process of privatization 
policy, not only the rate of spillovers but the endogenous leadership position in R&D timing should be 
well-investigated.  
However, limitations remain largely due to model-specific assumptions. We need to examine the 
robustness of the results when there are multiple domestic or foreign private firms under the general 
functional forms when the firms compete in prices or quantities sequentially or simultaneously. Further, 
it is also important to analyze the effects of endogenous entry in an oligopolistic market and investigate 
the effect of governmental intervention in terms of subsidization and partial privatization policies. These 
are promising and challenging topics for future research. 
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